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Abstract 
This Discussion Paper argues that the government has been right both in 
its rejection of market solutions to health insurance and in its injection of 
competition into provider markets. The particular advantages of the latter 
are that the collective expression of dk,idand maintained, with impetus being 
given to the better identification of health care needs and the most effective 
ways of meeting them. The ill effects of provider competition in the United 
States are outlined and reasons for not expecting them to be replicated in 
Britain explained. Emphasis is laid on the powerful moral rase for efficiency 
in the provision of health care, and clear definitions of this much-abused 
term are offered. The reforms of the White Paper are likely to strengthen the 
hands of ministers in securing a larger share of the public expenditure cake 
a 
for health care. The changes post no threat to the traditional pursuit of 
equity in the NHS and are appropriate means of attaining what Professor Culyer 
rat  is "communism in health" (to each according to her need; from each 
according to financial ability). Difficulties are anticipated both from the 
speed of implementation and, in particular, from the fragmentation of the 
demand side between health authorities, general practitioners, and local 
authorities. The need for further change and rationalisation is anticipated 
here. 
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The Internal Market: An Acceptable Means to a Desirable End 
A. J. Culyer 
1. 	 Only the End can Justify the Means  
Let us assume, without too much discussion (even though it 
is plainly contentious), that the objective of health services is 
to promote health and to do so, moreover, in such a fashion as to 
maximise the impact on the nation's health of whatever resources 
are made available to that end, while satisfying various equity 
constraints to do with geographical availability and individual 
terms of access. If you accept that premise as a properly moral 
point of departure, then a number of major implications flow from 
it: 
(1) the health service should be as efficient as it can be made 
(2) we need better information on health needs and health 
outcomes than we currently have 
(3) competition among financing (viz. insurance) agencies is 
inconsistent with these aims 
The rest of the paper seeks to explain these inferences. It 
is worth emphasising at the outset, however, that the fundamental 
touchstone relates to the meeting of the health needs of 
individuals: the patient (actual or potential) comes first. It 
is in terms of this end that means such as provider competition 
40 are to be evaluated. It is in this sense that means are to 
justified (or not, as the case may be) by the ends. Indeed, it 
is hard to see what, other than ends, could ever possibly justify 
any means. This is not, of course, to say that any means can be 
justified by reference to an end. It is all too easy to imagine 
some means so awful that no end could possibly justify them. It 
is also easy to imagine some ends that are themselves so awful 
that we would immediately reject all means of attaining them. 
But if we agree on a morally acceptable end (or ends), then the 
question becomes one of selecting the most appropriate means of 
achieving it (or them). In this sense, it is only the end(s) 
that can justify the means - if anything can. I hope, therefore, 
that we can for present purposes accept the ends I have 
postulated (and, at least for the time being, bear with their 
ill-definition) and discuss provider competition in internal - or 
even wider - markets in terms of its appropriateness as a means. 
2. 	 The Morality of Efficiency 
(4) provider competition may be the most effective means of 	 Efficiency has three meanings, which cumulatively embrace 
attaining the efficiency objective 	 those that go before: 
(5) provider competition need pose no threat to the traditional 
equity objectives of the NHS. 
a. Not using more resources than are necessary to achieve an 
end 
The second meaning of efficiency meets this requirement. 
This is sometimes referred to as efficacy or effectiveness. 
 It enjoins us not to squander resources. Given an objective, 
such as returning the patient to normal functioning as speedily 
as possible, one should therefore seek those combinations of 
diagnostic procedures, medicines, surgical procedures, inpatient 
and outpatient care, health service and social service and family 
caring, and the patient's own time, that are most effective. To 
use more of any of these resources than is necessary is wasteful 
and inconsistent with the objective of maximising the impact of 
resources on health in the community. For, if more than is 
necessary is used, the excess could have been used at no cost to 
the patients in question in order to further the health of some 
other patients. Thus, overall community health is lower than it 
need be. Overall community SMRs may also be higher than they 
need be. 
While this definition seems fine to me - so far as it goes - 
it does not really go terribly far. There is usually more than 
one combination of resources represented in more than one method 
of case management that satisfies the definition. There are 
substitutions between drugs, between medicine and surgery, 
between institutional and community care, and so on, which can be 
made. This gives rise to the great variety of practice that can 
be observed within health districts, between them, and across 
national boundaries. Although some of these variations may 
represent inefficiency, many of them may be equally efficient in, 
the sense of effective. We therefore need a tighter definition. 
b. Not incurring a higher cost than is necessary to achieve an 
end  
This is usually termed cost-effectiveness. It requires the 
selection from among the effective modes of case-management of 
that which is judged to be least costly. To incur a higher cost 
than is necessary is again wasteful and inconsistent with the 
objective of maximising the impact of resources on health in the 
community. If a higher cost than is necessary is incurred, the 
excess could have been used at no cost to the patients in 
question in order to further the health of some other patients. 
Thus, overall community health is lower than it need be. 
The trouble with this definition is that, although it 
affords a clear criterion for evaluating the efficiency of 
whatever it is that one is doing so that, for a given expected 
outcome and other patient-oriented attributes of the procedure, 
the cost is minimised, it does not tell us whether the procedure 
is actually worth what it costs and, in particular, whether there 
are not other programmes of care whose health payoffs may be 
higher at the margin (given the resources currently committed to 
them) than those of the programme whose cost-effectiveness has 
just been considered. 
It is worth noting that the notion of "cost" that I am 
employing is no simple financial concept, and that it is the 
economist's standard notion. If benefit is to be seen in terms of 
health outcomes obtained (or expected), then cost is the benefit 
(similarly defined) that could have been obtained had the 
•here is that a fully efficient health care system will have 
sufficient resources devoted to it such that, at the margin, the 
resources in question been applied in the most beneficial 
alternative way. In transactions in a well-functioning market, 
prices tend to signal the value of these lost benefits by virtue 
of the fact that competition for resources requires those who 
demand them to outbid other demanders, so the price reveals the 
alternative value in use. But without a market - for example, 
within a hospital - direct judgments have to be made about such 
opportunity costs, which should again, if they are to be 
consistent with the objective, be couched in terms of benefit to 
the patient. 
Although the concept of cost may therefore be quite 
consistent with my point of departure, the second meaning of 
efficiency is still deficient. We need a still tighter 
definition. The third meaning of efficiency meets this 
requirement. 
c. 	 Not incurring a higher cost than is necessary to achieve an 
end plus attaining an appropriate rate of throughput or 
output 
This meaning requires not only cost-effectiveness but also 
an appropriate workload, which may be higher, lower, or the same 
as the current rate. The judgment that needs to be made here is 
usually a marginal one: is the gain to be had in the form, say, 
of added community health from a cost-effective programme worth 
the additional cost or, in the case of a possibly reduced scale 
of activity, is the value placed upon the lost health smaller, 
larger, or the same as the costs thereby saved? The general idea  
gain in health is judged to be of equal value to the additional 
costs incurred, and that the resources within the health care 
system are so distributed that their payoff per additional pound 
of cost is equalised across all programmes of care. 1 
The morality of this definition of efficiency is again 
clear: if the condition is not met, then either resources used 
elsewhere would be better employed in health care or resources 
used in health care would be better employed elsewhere. The 
"elsewhere" may, of course, be in programmes that affect health 
but that are not themselves health services. 
Health needs and health outcomes 
The NHS, like all health care systems, has been handicapped 
in its pursuit of both efficiency and equity by a desperate 
shortage of information about needs and outcomes. On the 
efficiency side, it is only recently that it has become possible 
to make approximate assessments of the health payoffs from 
alternative packages of care. The main reason for this has been 
the absence of quantitative measures of even an approximate type 
that would enable more subtle comparisons than can be made by 
means of relative mortality or survival rates. In the UK, one 
such new instrument that has proved useful in such fields as the 
care of the elderly and clinical practice is the Quality Adjusted 
Life Year (or QALY). The QALY has the great merit of 
highlighting the value content inherent in any outcome measure. 
While it is pretty obvious that there are important value 
questions embodied in the notions of both benefit and cost 
discussed earlier, it is less obvious precisely what the crucial 
judgments are that need to be made and who should be making them. 
The QALY sets this agenda out very clearly. It also indicates 
that there are quite substantial variations in the average costs 
per QALY across programmes. Although these are not the marginal 
costs one would ideally prefer, data of the sort indicated in 
Table 1 suggest pretty strongly that current resource allocations 
are not making their maximal impact and they also suggest the 
general directions in which it may be sensible to try to 
redistribute resources. 
Developments of this kind can also afford ministers an 
enhanced bargaining power with the Treasury in the PES round, as 
evidence for the expected payoff of judiciously targeted 
additional public expenditure. They also offer - at least in my 
judgment - the most satisfactory means of reaching a view on that 
very vexed question as to whether the NHS is underfunded. 
A need for health care exists when a patient has the 
capacity to benefit from the consumption of health services 2 . If 
the care is not effective, it cannot be said to be needed. If 
the technology that would improve someone's health for the better 
does not currently exist, current services cannot be said to be 
needed (though it may well be that research is needed). In 
deciding what needs shall be met, however, it is essential to be 
able to form a judgment about the likely size of the benefit (in 
terms, say, of enhanced health). So, if needs are to be fairly 
met (for example, equal treatment for equal need) it becomes 
Table 1: 'League Table' of Costs and QALYs for Selected 
Health Care Interventions (1983/4 prices)  
Intervention 	 Present Value of 
Extra Cost per 
QALY Gained (£) 
GP advice to stop smoking 	 170 
Pacemaker implantation for heart block 	 700 
Hip replacement 	 750 
CABG for severe angina LMD 	 1040 
GP control of total serum cholesterol 
	
1700 
CABG for severe angina with 2VD 	 2280 
Kidney transplantation (cadaver) 	 3000 
Breast cancer screening 	 3500 
Heart transplantation 	 5000 
CABG for mild angina 2VD 	 12600 
Hospital haemodialysis 	 14000 
Notes: 	 CABG - coronary artery bypass graft 
LMD - left main disease 
2VD - two vessel disease 
Adapted from: Williams, A.H., 'Economics of Coronary Artery 
Bypass Grafting', BMJ, 291, 1985, 326-9. 
important to be able to prioritise need. It is also worth noting 
that the important thing about capacity to benefit is that it 
must be seen in terms of changes in health status. An absolutely 
or relatively high mortality or morbidity rate does not in itself 
indicate a high need: that depends on whether there is a 
capacity for the rate to be reduced sufficiently by the 
application of the relevant resources for it to command a 
priority relative to other needs. Moreover, it is the 
contribution of health care to the potential health improvement 
that is important. Many conditions are, for example, self-
limiting, so one is concerned with the faster recovery that 
health care enables rather than the probability of recovery 
itself. In other cases one may not actually expect a payoff in 
terms of better health than before, but rather in terms of better 
health than would otherwise have been the case - amelioration 
rather than cure, reduction rather than elimination of 
disability, slowing rather than stopping deteriorations. 
There may also be a "big tradeoff" (to use Arthur Okun's 
phrase3 ) between efficiency and equity. For example, in remote 
areas where the population is thinly distributed, the cost per 
unit of effectiveness may be relatively high, implying that on 
efficiency grounds alone community health could be increased by 
redistributing resources away from such localities towards those 
where population density is greater and cost per case lower. 
This is, however, likely to offend against any 
that requires approximately equal geographical accessibility. If 
such is the case, it is natural to allocate general resources  
hotel dimensions of institutional care whose neglect the NHS has 
frequently been taken to task for in the past. If I have 
focussed on health status in all this talk about efficiency, 
equity and need, it is because this is the prime business of the 
NHS (I make no apology for asserting that) and because it is only 
relatively recently that it has become possible to assess 
effectiveness - and cost-effectiveness - in such a fashion that 
decision-makers like doctors and purchasing authorities are going 
to be able to use these ideas and real evidence to evaluate their 
practice and to frame the terms of contracts. It can scarce3y be 
doubted that the reforms of Working for Patients also lend a 
renewed urgency to the further development of operationally and 
managerially sensible measures of need and outcome. Fortunately, 
there is now lots on which people can build. 
equity principle 
(say, in the form of regional or district budgets) on a 
capitation basis, with the pursuit of efficiency in the meeting 
of local needs being conducted within the constraints that the 
equity rule imposes, and accepting that the ultimate cost of 
equity may be higher overall mortality and morbidity than it 
actually lay within our power to attain. 4 
Time and space prohibit my indulging in the details of 
health and needs measurement - fascinating though such an 
indulgence would be. Moreover, I am well aware that "health" is 
not the only product of health services. I do not wish it to be 
thought that I think that the NHS should neglect important 
dimensions of performance like the supply of "reassurance", or 
comfort, courtesy and respect for individual dignity, or the 
4. The NHS as a Demand-side Organisation 
The traditional arguments for why health care is "different" 
from other goods and services are almost exclusively demand-side 
arguments4 which argue in particular for a low or zero user-
price, for low-cost subsidised insurance and for preserving so 
far as possible the integrity of the "agency" role of the 
physician - in particular for helping the doctor, whether in 
general or hospital practice, to form professional judgments 
about a patient's needs and how best they might be met out of 
available resources, without being contaminated by other 
professional (provider) interests (especially those that 
determine the doctor's pay). 5 
10 9 
In my view these arguments amount to a pretty unassailable 
case for a health service having the following characteristics: 
(1) The insurance function is monopolised by the state rather 
than by competitive private insurers, thus avoiding 
premium-loading through failure to secure scale economies on 
the finance side, the possibility of monopoly premium-
setting, extensive billing and fraud-checking administrative 
and legal costs, adverse selection through community 
premium-setting, inequity through experience premium-
setting, a host of "gaps" in coverage arising from 
employment status and inability to pay, and publicly 
unaccountable methods of controlling the excess demands that 
all insurance systems throw up (such as indemnity limits, 
co-insurance, and privately determined quantity limits on 
the supply side). 6 
(2) Access to care should be determined by need rather than (for 
example) insurance status, income, social or ethnic group, 
or any other nonhealth related factor. 
(3) The bargaining and regulatory power of the state should be 
used to countervail the monopoly professional and supplier 
organisations and to enforce standards of safety and quality 
determined in publicly accountable procedures. 
(4) Professionals should be rewarded adequately but primarily by 
salary and capitation rather than by fee for service. 
It is striking that, while these desiderata all require the 
partial rejection of free market solutions, they do so for 
demand-side reasons and for the most part involve a heavy 
rejection of market-determined resource allocations only on the 
demand side. The relevance of the collective expression of 
demand lies in its ability to specify and regulate need. It is 
appropriate therefore that health authorities, for example, 
should specify a demand for the care of their client populations. 
But none of these traditional arguments for health care being 
"different" requires the public ownership of the means of 
production (viz. doctors' practices or institutional care 
providers). Not least among the benefits of Working for Patients  
is the clear distinction between purchaser and provider that it 
has introduced into public discussion. I contend that all of the 
major ideological strengths of the NHS relate to characteristics 
of demand. The job of the supply side is simply (!) to be cost-
effective at meeting whatever demands are placed upon it by the 
demand side. Its ownership and structure ought to be whatever 
pattern of ownership and structural features prove as a practical 
matter to be cost-effective and responsive in the way just 
described. Nothing less than this, but also nothing more. What 
matters is what works. What matters is what means are best 
suited to the ends determined by the collective demanders. The 
supply side is not judged by ideological but by practical 
criteria. Whether directly managed units, or trusts, or private 
organisations (for-profit or non-profit) best satisfy the 
requirements of NHS demanders is something to be determined by 
experience and judgment. It is not an a priori matter. The NHS 
is essentially a demand-side organisation - or so it should be. 
Muddling supply-side features inside the public NHS not only begs 
12 1 1 
the question as to the most effective means of delivering what is 
needed, it also exposes it to the serious hazard of domination by 
supplier interests that are independent of, and may b e 
 inconsistent with, the true objectives of the patient-oriented 
demand side. 
overseas demanders (increasingly one may expect from the rest of 
the European Community). The second is competition between 
incumbents and potential new entrants to the market for the right  
to provide service. It is a competition for franchises and, in 
the economics literature, it goes under the generic term of 
"contestability". 8 
5. 	 Provider Competition 
If competition between providers of finance has scarcely any 
redeeming features, the same cannot be said for competition 
between providers of care. The particular attraction of 
competition on the health care provider side is that it provides 
the very systematic incentives for efficiency and innovation 
that are so conspicuously lacking in the NHS and dispenses with 
the need for the periodic sledgehammer strategy of financial 
squeeze (which has penalised the efficient and the inefficient 
rather indiscriminately). 
There are two forms of competition that can be exploited, 
though Working for Patients emphasises only the first of these: 
(1) competition within a market 
and 
(2) competition for a market. 
The first of these is competition between existing or 
incumbent providers (public or private, trusts, or DMUs) for 
various contracts offered by purchasing authorities, fund-holding 
GPs, other GPs, local authorities, private demanders, and 
I want to fasten on to three aspects of provider competition 
as worthy of particular attention: the rather poor performance of 
competition in the USA; the problems arising from possible 
monopoly behaviour by providers and the attendant need (though 
this is not unequivocal) for some form of price, quantity and 
quality regulation; and the problems that may arise from having 
multiple demanders under the arrangements in Working for  
Patients. Let me address each of these briefly. 
The US experience. Competition between providers in the USA has 
led, not to greater efficiency and lower costs, but to the 
duplication of services, excess capacity, higher costs (and 
hospital cost inflation persistently above general inflation) and 
(though the evidence is somewhat ambiguous here) inferior 
clinical outcomes. it is crucially important to understand that 
these adverse results are less due to provider competition per se 
than to the particular market environment in which US providers 
operate. One factor is that comprehensive insurance (despite the 
fact that 50 million US citizens have either no private or public 
cover, or extremely inadequate cover) reduces the incentive for 
demanders, whether patients or physicians, to select providers on 
the basis of quality balanced by cost, and generates pressures on 
providers to compete on a non-price basis. This is only 
13 	 14 
partially constrained by the consequential upward pressure 
on 
premiums, because premiums are not prices of using the service. 
Premiums enfranchise people to use a range of services at a 
user-price less than their cost. Hence premiums serve to reduce 
demand as they increase only through the effect they have on 
residual disposable income, rather than the direct disincentive 
that a rising user-price would have. Premiums are anyway subject 
to tax-relief and are normally part paid by employers. Moreover, 
rising costs arising from one's own use of service are borne by 
all policyholders. In the NHS, by contrast, purchasers are 
effectively expenditure capped and are to make contracts in the 
interests of entire resident populations or an entire GP's list. 
Demand, in general, is expressed in a collective fashion which 
sets the availability of resources into which the individual 
demand decisions of (mostly) doctors has to fit (and which is to 
be planned in conjunction with such expected individual demands).  
the prospective budgeting arrangements in Working for Patients. 9 
Moac2221Y2_ Monopoly arises when there is a single provider or a 
small group of colluding providers. It affords them greater 
discretion over price, quality and output than they have under 
competition, and is generally associated with higher prices, 
lower output or throughput, and higher unit costs. The latter is 
particularly to be expected in non-profit organisations in which 
"profit" is taken in the form of a higher rate of use of some 
inputs than is necessary (especially highly skilled human ones 
and the technical equipment that every able technician can never 
This enhances the job-satisfaction of the 
providers themselves and can easily be passed off to the innocent 
public as better quality. (The question is altogether begged, of 
course, as to whether the extra costs incurred actually benefit 
patients and, even if they do, as to whether the benefit is large 
enough to justify the expense). 
410, 	 get enough of). 
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Moreover, in the USA, the retrospective cost-based 
reimbursement system has enabled most providers to bill the 
insurer for whatever costs are implied by the services it has 
been decided (eg. by physicians and hospitals) to provide, 
usually on a fee for service and per diem basis. Third party 
reimbursement plus retrospective compensation at a rate 
determined by providers has confronted demanders with an 
effectively open-ended budget constraint which has been widely 
held responsible for the substantial hospital cost inflation 
experienced over many years in the USA (and to the visitor is 
most apparent in the spectacular atriums and lavish parklands 
that greet one on entering hospitals). This cannot happen under 
The policy response to these problems can be of two kinds. 
The first seeks to suppress the operation of the market via 
centrally determined price schedules (based on DRGs for example) 
and myriad other controls. The second seeks to encourage the 
effective operation of the market via information dissemination 
(eg. about historic cost patterns locally and elsewhere, DRGs, 
performance indicators of various kinds, and prices struck 
elsewhere in the system between purchasers and providers) and by 
exposing incumbents (especially monopoly incumbents) to the 
threat of entry of new providers by making markets more 
contestable. I lean strongly towards the second of these two 
responses, partly on grounds that any suppression of the working 
15 
of the market tends to destroy beneficial as well as adverse 
effects (this is very evident in the case of centrally determined 
price schedules), partly on the ground that such regulation is 
costly and may also come, through customary political processes, 
to be dominated by provider interests, and partly on the ground 
that a strategy aimed at making the market operate more 
effectively is more likely to deliver cost-effective contracts, 
especially if there were a greater emphasis on contestability, 
which can be a complete answer to a monopoly problem posed by one 
or a few collusive incumbents. 
However, there can be no denying that contestability, 
selective contracting, openness in costing and prices, can all 
impose an awkward dilemma for politicians, who may not be able to 
escape a residual responsibility for poor performers (in a world 
in which poor performance becomes increasingly easy to identify) 
and who may, in particular, come under intense political 
pressure to prevent some incumbents from going out of business - 
even though they offer services that no one wants and which 
purchasers have been able to purchase satisfactorily elsewhere 
with no net loss either of employment or of service for client 
populations. 
Multiple demanders. Under the new arrangements, a collective 
demand is not expressed solely (as would in my judgment have 
proved preferable) by a single purchasing agency acting for its 
population catchment area, purchasing from a wide variety of 
potential providers (including voluntary agencies and local 
authority social services) and able to exert considerable 
17  
monopsony power -0 to hold down prices for maximum throughput of 
contracted caseloads with contracted arrangements for quality 
assurance, and the ability to stipulate the providers to whom GPs 
would normally be able to refer. What we have instead is the 
clear possibility of different local judgments of need being 
reached by health authorities, FPCs and local authorities, which 
may be difficult to reconcile and impossible, even if agreed, to 
enforce. With competition between GPs, moreover, (particularly 
non-fundholding GPs) there is the danger that they will be under 
greater pressure than hitherto to refer to non-contracted 
providers offering relatively attractive packages of services but 
whose cost consequences the health authority has little power to 
control. It is not possible to assess the likely practical 
significance of this at the present time but there is clearly the 
possibility that some of the adverse features of competition in 
the USA may arise in Britain since the demand decision and the 
bearing of the financial consequences are effectively separated. 
The ability of health authorities to make appropriate deals 
with FPCs, fundholders, other GPs, and local authorities remains 
to be tested. It is an area of considerable uncertainty at 
present. As the number of fundholders increases, the problem in 
one sense will become less because the demand and its financial 
consequences will become increasingly localised on the same 
decision-making unit. However, by the same token, the bargaining 
power of health authorities will also fall as this process takes 
place and their recurrent funding becomes increasingly topsliced. 
As the principal agencies responsible for assessing a district's 
needs and determining the most cost-effective means of meeting 
them, health authorities may find themselves increasingly unable 
18 
to implement the strategies that would seem most appropriate. 
These problems will be the more pressing in a world in which 
local authorities feel their budgets to be under great pressure 
and might decide to allocate resources to non-health priority 
areas. 
6. 	 Equity 
Provider competition poses in itself no particular 
impediment to the attainment of whatever equity objectives are 
set. Indeed, if its effect is to increase cost-effectiveness and 
better matches of case-mix, workload and quality to population 
needs, equity is likely to be enhanced. The revision of RAWP is 
not an inherent part of the competition strategy but budget 
allocations within regions can clearly depart from a strict 
capitation basis if regional needs assessments suggest this would 
be more equitable. Regional initiatives in clarifying and 
implementing appropriate local notions of equity will, of course, 
be need- rather than supply-based. If district funding is 
needs-based, decisions at that level about the place of treatment 
 
of patients will need to weigh the advantages of treatment close 
to patients' homes against the possibly lower unit costs and/or 
higher quality and/or shorter waiting times that may be available 
elsewhere. This partly involves equity issues, but it also 
involves judgments of effectiveness and efficiency in matters 
like the integration of community, GP and institutionally based 
services that are entirely appropriately made at local levels 
within the general equity constraints set by central government 
and region. 
It will be important for purchasers to bear equity issues in 
mind when formulating and placing contracts. For example, the 
notion of "equal treatment for equal need" has implications for 
hospitals' admissions policies that will need to be made explicit 
- and to be monitored. 
The development of much better information about community 
health care needs and the most cost-effective means of meeting 
them is one of the most promising parts of Working for Patients  
and will eventually enable much more explicit judgments to be 
made at all levels about both equity and efficiency. It can also 
be expected that, within regions and districts, not all will 
reach the same view of equity, how best to implement strategies 
designed to improve it, and the way in which tradeoffs between it 
and efficiency should be made when the two conflict. Perhaps 
this is as it should be for, if the notions of effectiveness and 
efficiency are reasonably clear - at least in principle - the 
same cannot be said for equity, for which many criteria vie for 
supremacy ll . It may therefore be neither surprising nor 
undesirable if different criteria and different judgments in 
their application emerge in different places. 
7. 	 Conclusions  
The strategy of Working for Patients seems to me to be one 
that can be welcomed by all who care about the NHS. It does not 
prejudice the equity objectives of the NHS and it offers 
considerable scope for enhancing its efficiency. This is highly 
acceptable morally because inefficiency implies that some 
19 20 
patients necessarily go without the care that a more efficient 
system would, with the same resource base, have provided. I t 
also promises to be a more responsive service: more responsive, 
 
that is, both to the collective expression of need by authorities 
and to the individual preferences of patients. The NHS is, 
however, already relatively cost-effective in general - so far as 
sabotage any real change. But even were that not so, such major 
experiments are quite extraordinarily difficult to evaluate 
independently of the vast array of incidental pressures and 
changes that inevitable accompany them. It is also always 
necessary to compromise in the design of any experiment based 
only on part  of a system but intended to model the working of the 
one can tell from various international comparisons 12 . S o whole (for 
example, by omitting regional interactions). So we 
whether the new strategy will generate sufficient cost-savings 
and sufficiently substantial resource reallocation between 
patient groups according to the best evidence of effectiveness, 
so as markedly to improve the impact of NHS resources on the 
nation's health, remains to be seen. However, at the very least 
it will, over time, make more clear what has previously been 
extremely opaque: the link (at the margin) between resources and 
outcome. I believe that this will help ministers in their battle 
for resources for the NHS in the PES round. 
Any major change of the sort we are experiencing brings, of 
course, major uncertainty and major worry. I have alluded to my 
worries about the fragmented demand side. The pace is also 
frenetic. Indeed, the biggest threat to the strategy's success is 
probably that insufficient time will have been allowed to ensure 
that the early stages operate smoothly and without delays being 
imposed on patients and their doctors in the prompt matching of 
need and care. 
Although I was once (in 1987/88) an advocate of regional 
experiment, I recognise now that such experiments could all too 
easily have served, as ministers have claimed, to postpone or 
21  
are in for an all-or-none experiment and I am not much impressed 
by the (extraordinarily late in the day!) awakening of awareness 
in the Royal Colleges and the Upper House that a more limited 
experiment might (at one time) have been a sensible way of 
proceeding. It may not have told us much. It might have been 
used for destructive purposes. In any case it is now too late. 
But the all-or-none game implies that we (and I think here 
especially of the research community) will have to monitor what 
goes on extremely carefully, and the government should be 
prepared to invest substantially in such monitoring of the 
system's behaviour. Policy makers at every level must be 
adaptable so as to close off avenues that are destructive of the 
ends of the strategy and to open up new avenues that might help. 
I expect that there will be a lot of "cleaning up" to be done, 
particularly on the demand side. 
Provider competition is going to be, however, a reasonably 
assured success. The adverse effects of competition as seen in 
the USA are unlikely to emerge in the UK - the reason for doubt 
on this score lying in the possible behaviour of the GP sector. 
The strategy is has much to commend it in principle and, even if 
it is less than perfectly consistent on the demand side, we 
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shall have time enough to monitor progress and make the required 
changes. 
Notes 
1.  
2.  
A final area of uncertainty not discussed hitherto lies with 
the behaviour of politicians. The combination of better evidence 
of effectiveness in meeting need and of better quality (or of 
their absence) and the ruthless judgment of markets on poor 
performers is going to make politicians accountable in all sorts 
of ways that the opacity of the present system protects them 
from. If they prove chicken, their ability to compromise the 
good that the internal market can generate is, of course, 
limitless. So too is the power of politicians having an outdated 
and unwarranted commitment to supply-side socialism (though not 
the other kind). But if you really believe, as I do, in 
"communism in health" (to each according to her need and from 
each financially according to her ability) then the prospect of a 
tax-financed NHS in which demand is collectively expressed and 
providers are constrained by market forces to meet the needs thus 
specified, and the funding is at worst proportional to ability to 
pay, is a prospect that all should be able to welcome. 
This view is extensively developed in my Need and the  
National Health Service, London, Martin Robertson, 1976. 
See my Need ..., op. cit., A.J. Culyer, R.J. Lavers and 
A. Williams, "Social indicators: health", Social Trends, 
2, 1971, 31-42, and my "The normative economics of health 
care finance and provision", Oxford Review of Economic  
Policy, 5, 1, 1989, 34-58. 
3. See A.M. Okun, Equity and Efficiency: the Big Tradeoff, 
Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1975. Also, my 
"Inequality of health services is, in general, desirable" 
in D. Green (ed.) Acceptable Inequalities, London, 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1988, 31-47; and 
"Commodities, characteristics of commodities, utilities 
and the quality of life" in S. Baldwin, C. Godfrey and C. 
Propper (eds.) The Quality of Life: Perspectives and  
Policies, London, Routledge, 1989, 9-27. 
4. See my "The nature of the commodity 'health care' and its 
efficient allocation" Oxford Economic Papers, 23, 1971, 
189-211; "Medical care and the economics of giving", 
Economica, 38, 1971, 295-303; and "The NHS and the 
market: images and realities" in G. McLachlin and A. 
Maynard (eds.) The Public/Private Mix for Health, London, 
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1982, 25-55. 
5. See G. Evans, "Supplier induced demand: some empirical 
evidence and implications" in M. Perlman (ed.) The  
Economics of Health and Medical Care, London, Macmillan, 
1974, 162-173. 
6. See, for a review of these issues, A.J. Culyer, C. 
Donaldson and K. Gerard, Financial Aspects of Health 
Services: Drawing on Experience, London, Institute of 
Health Services Management, Working Paper No. 4, 1988. 
7. See my "The radical reforms the NHS needs - and doesn't", 
Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Social Services  
Committee, London, HMSO, 1988, 238-242. 
8. See W.S. Baumol, C. Panzar and R.D. Willig, Contestable 
Markets and the Theory of Industrial Structure, New York, 
Harcourt Brace, 1988. 
9. For a fuller review of US experience, see A.J. Culyer and 
J.W. Posnett, "Hospital Behaviour and Competition", 1990, 
(forthcoming). 
23 24 
10. Monopsony is the converse of monopoly: it is a buyer's 
rather than a seller's domination of the market. 
Although difficult to quantify, the monopsony power of 
the NHS must have been a major factor in containing 
health care expenditures in the UK through aggressive 
price and wage/salary strategies. 
11. See, for example, G. Mooney, Economics, Medicine and 
Health Care, Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1986, ch. 8. 
12. See my "Cost-containment in Europe", Health Care 
Financing Review, Annual Suppl. 1989, 21-32. 
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